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The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should 
Lead Recusal Reform 
Deborah Goldberg,* James Sample,** and David E. Pozen*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, we have seen an escalation of attacks on the inde-
pendence of the judiciary.  Government officials and citizens who have 
been upset by the substance of judicial decisions are increasingly seek-
ing to rein in the courts by limiting their jurisdiction over controversial 
matters,1 soliciting pre-election commitments from judicial candidates,2 
and drafting ballot initiatives with sanctions for judges who make un-
popular rulings.3  Many of these efforts betray ignorance at best, or de-
fiance at worst, of traditional principles of separation of powers and 
constitutional protections against tyranny of the majority. 
The attacks are fueled in part by the growing influence of money in 
judicial elections and the dismantling of codes of judicial ethics that 
once helped to preserve the distinctive character of the judiciary, even 
during the course of campaigns for the bench.  The unabated accelera-
 
 * Deborah Goldberg is the Democracy Program Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at 
New York University School of Law.  She is a graduate of Harvard Law School and holds a Ph.D. in 
philosophy from The Johns Hopkins University.  This article is an edited version of a lecture Ms. 
Goldberg delivered at the Washburn University School of Law’s Shamberg Symposium on Novem-
ber 1, 2006.  Ms. Goldberg thanks Dean William J. Rich for the invitation to participate in the Sym-
posium and the editors of the Washburn Law Journal for their assistance in preparing the speech for 
publication.  She also acknowledges the extensive contributions of her co-authors, without whose 
thorough research and skillful drafting neither the lecture nor this article would have been possible. 
 ** James Sample is counsel in the Democracy Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at 
the New York University School of Law.  He holds a J.D. from Columbia Law School, where he was 
a Harlan Fiske Stone and James Kent Scholar. 
 *** David Pozen was a 2006 summer intern in the Democracy Program of the Brennan Center 
for Justice at New York University School of Law.  He expects to earn his J.D. from Yale Law 
School in 2007. 
 1. See David Rottman, The State Courts in 2005: A Year of Living Dangerously, in 38 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 237, 237 (2006) (summarizing state court 
jurisdiction-stripping measures), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/Documents/ 
YearOfLivingDangerously.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan. 2006) (discussing the 
questionnaire submitted by the plaintiff to judicial candidates); Barbara E. Reed, Tripping the Rift: 
Navigating Judicial Speech Fault Lines in the Post-White Landscape, 56 MERCER L. REV. 971, 996-
1016 (2005) (documenting the growing role of judicial candidate questionnaires and providing exam-
ples). 
 3. The Judicial Accountability Initiative Law (“J.A.I.L. 4 Judges”) was on the ballot in South 
Dakota in 2006.  It would have created a Special Grand Jury empowered to sanction judges who 
made decisions it found unacceptable.  Voters rejected the ballot measure by a margin of seventy-
eight points (eighty-nine percent to eleven percent). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997320
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tion of those trends erodes public confidence in the ability of courts to 
serve as fair arbiters of disputes.  Moreover, the undifferentiated cyni-
cism bred by those trends tars all courts—elective and appointive, state 
and federal—with the same brush, undermining resistance even to ex-
treme anti-judicial rhetoric and activism.  The threat is sufficiently seri-
ous to command attention at the highest levels of the judiciary.4 
The time has come for elected courts, which are at the eye of the 
storm, to replace anxiety about declining public trust with active meas-
ures to restore it.  Without a meaningful response to legitimate concerns 
induced by their own campaign-related behavior, judges cannot expect 
the public to rise to their defense when their authority is questioned on 
illegitimate grounds.  To protect judicial independence, generally, 
elected courts must embrace the public demand for accountability—not 
by yielding to pressure on hot-button issues, but by recognizing that 
with independence comes a duty to preserve both the reality and ap-
pearance of justice.  Elected courts must demonstrate their accountabil-
ity for the decisions they make by more aggressively distancing them-
selves from situations in which their fairness and impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned. 
Readers familiar with the American Bar Association’s Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct will recognize in this exhortation a call for stiffer 
disqualification or recusal policies.5  Canon 3E(1) of that Code, which 
has been adopted in some form by nearly every state and by Congress, 
provides: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  This 
article suggests that current disqualification doctrines and procedures 
are inadequate to preserve public trust and that, to safeguard their own 
independence, courts should consider a variety of reforms.  Part II de-
scribes trends undermining public confidence and explains how, in two 
recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has both exacerbated 
the impact of those trends and absolved itself of responsibility for pro-
viding a solution.  In Parts III and IV, respectively, we offer a brief his-
 
 4. Recently retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has noted that attacks on the judiciary are 
now being launched by judges themselves: 
Earlier this year, Alabama Supreme Court Justice Tom Parker excoriated his colleagues for 
faithfully applying the Supreme Court’s precedent in Roper v. Simmons, which prohibited 
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by minors.  Offering a bold reinter-
pretation of the Constitution’s supremacy clause, Justice Parker advised state judges to 
avoid following Supreme Court opinions “simply because they are ‘precedents.’”  Justice 
Parker supported his criticism of “activist federal judges” by asserting that “the liberals on 
the U.S. Supreme Court . . . look down on the pro-family policies, Southern heritage, evan-
gelical Christianity, and other blessings of our great state.” 
Sandra Day O’Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A18. 
 5. Technically, there is a difference between disqualification and recusal—disqualification is 
mandatory, recusal is voluntary—but the difference is often blurred because in the many jurisdictions 
in which judges adjudicate challenges to their own qualification to sit, disqualification functions es-
sentially as recusal.  In this article, we use the terms interchangeably but distinguish between manda-
tory and voluntary removal of a judge from a case. 
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tory of disqualification law and an explanation why, as it is currently in-
terpreted, it cannot solve the urgent problems of today.  Finally, Part V 
outlines ten proposals for strengthening recusal that acknowledge the 
public’s legitimate demand for accountability while protecting the judi-
ciary’s institutional need for independence. 
II. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS 
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a “fundamental 
tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real 
world of electoral politics.”6  But two of the Court’s recent decisions 
have markedly exacerbated that tension.  Republican Party of Minne-
sota v. White7 is responsible for undermining longstanding norms that 
protected the distinctive character of judicial campaigning.  Avery v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.8 looks the other way as 
the growing influence of money on judicial campaigns erodes public 
confidence in fair and impartial courts.  Together, the two decisions 
place the onus on elected courts to strengthen recusal rules and prac-
tices. 
A. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and Its Aftermath 
At issue in White was a particular clause of the Minnesota Code of 
Judicial Conduct—the “Announce Clause”—which prohibited any can-
didate for judicial office from “announc[ing] his or her views on dis-
puted legal or political issues.”9  The Supreme Court held, five votes to 
four, that the Announce Clause unconstitutionally abridged the First 
Amendment rights of judicial candidates.  Justice Scalia’s majority opin-
ion recognized that, under some definitions, judicial impartiality might 
be a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify restraints on speech, 
but it concluded that the Announce Clause was not narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.10  The majority was unpersuaded by arguments that 
statements made during campaigns carry a special threat to the open-
mindedness of judges.11  Suggesting that prospective judges might dis-
semble with impunity on the campaign trail, Justice Scalia dismissed 
fears that judges would regard such statements as binding and thereby 
 
 6. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991). 
 7. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 8. 126 S. Ct. 1470 (2006). 
 9. White, 536 U.S. at 770. 
 10. Justice Scalia considered three definitions of “impartiality”: “lack of bias for or against ei-
ther party,” “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view,” and open-
mindedness.  Id. at 775-81.  For a critique of Justice Scalia’s proposed definitions, see J.J. GASS, 
AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 6-7 (2004), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/ji4.pdf. 
 11. See White, 536 U.S. at 780-81. 
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violate litigants’ due process rights to a fair hearing.12  In any event, sug-
gested Justice Kennedy in concurrence, such concerns might be ad-
dressed through “more rigorous” recusal standards.13 
The White Court discounted concerns that overturning the An-
nounce Clause would loose havoc on judicial elections.  In 2002, only 
nine states included Minnesota’s version of the Clause in their codes of 
judicial ethics,14 so the impact of White as a strictly legal matter was lim-
ited.  Moreover, the majority expressly stated that that “we neither as-
sert nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial 
office to sound the same as those for legislative office.”15  But those 
technicalities made little difference in the real world of judicial elec-
tions.  White unquestionably opened the door, as both a practical and 
jurisprudential matter, to forces seeking to benefit from highly politi-
cized courts. 
The impact on the conduct of campaigns was immediate and un-
mistakable.  Candidates in many states received questionnaires soliciting 
their positions on controversial topics such as abortion and equal mar-
riage rights for partners of the same sex.16  Although the candidates had 
a legal right not to answer, without any canon enforcing common ethical 
standards, the competitive pressure of campaigns made it exceedingly 
difficult to refuse.  Moreover, voters wanted to understand how pro-
spective judges were likely to approach the pressing issues of the day, 
and some candidates for the bench were eager to prove their allegiance 
to energized voting blocs and potential donors.  The press not only 
failed to warn of the risks to impartial decision-making presented by 
campaign promises, but also, in some instances, actively chided candi-
dates for being unwilling to take stands on whole categories of cases.  
The public interest in judges who could fairly hear both sides of a case 
increasingly was overwhelmed by special interests in judges who would 
reliably tilt the scales. 
Adding to the practical pressures created by White was a series of 
lawsuits seeking to expand the decision’s reach.  Candidates, political 
parties, and interest groups promoting more politicized judicial elections 
challenged an array of additional canons that constrained campaign 
conduct.  Three categories of canons were targets of litigation in the 
years immediately following White. 
First, codes of judicial ethics in many states ban “pledges or prom-
ises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial perform-
 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[States] may adopt recusal standards more rigor-
ous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these standards.”). 
 14. See Reed, supra note 2, at 982. 
 15. White, 536 U.S. at 783. 
 16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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ance of the duties of the office.”17  The purpose of the “Pledges or 
Promises Clause” is to prevent promises by judicial candidates that “im-
pair the integrity of the court by making the candidate appear to have 
pre-judged an issue without benefit of argument or counsel, applicable 
law, and the particular facts presented in each case.”18  Based on the 
same rationale, state canons also typically include a “Commit Clause,” 
which prohibits “statements that commit or appear to commit the can-
didate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to 
come before the court.”19  Taking aim at these provisions, some interest 
group questionnaires offered a “Decline to Respond” option indicating 
refusal to answer because of the canons, use of which plaintiffs then 
cited in lawsuits challenging the Pledges or Promises and Commit 
Clauses.20  While the White majority recognized that campaign promises 
might “pose a special threat to open-mindedness,”21 courts facing chal-
lenges to Pledges or Promises and Commit Clauses in the wake of White 
have reached mixed conclusions.22 
Courts are also split on the constitutionality of canons that prohibit 
judges and judicial candidates from directly soliciting campaign contri-
butions.  Prior to White, such bans generally were upheld because of the 
strong due process interests the bans served,23 and since White two 
courts have agreed.24  The Arkansas Supreme Court most recently ex-
plained: “We do not believe anyone can seriously argue that a judge 
personally soliciting campaign contributions from attorneys having cases 
before him or her should be permissible.”25  But the Eleventh Circuit 
 
 17. See, e.g., MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B.1.c (1994); OHIO CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2)(c) (1997). 
 18. Ackerman v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991). 
 19. See, e.g., KAN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (2006); PA. CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (2005). 
 20. See, e.g., Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879, 883 (N.D. Ind. 2006), ap-
peal docketed, No. 06-4333 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2006); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 
1209 (D. Kan. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-3290 (10th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006); see also Duwe v. Alex-
ander, No. 06-cv-00766, 2007 WL 840121 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 13, 2007) (using the inability to obtain an-
swers to questionnaires as grounds for challenging canons). 
 21. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002). 
 22. Compare Ala. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 
(D. Ala. 2005) (striking down Alaska’s Pledges or Promises Clause), and N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. 
v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039 (D.N.D. 2005) (“A careful reading of the majority opinion in 
White makes it clear that the ‘pledges and promises clause’ . . . [is] not long for this world.”), with 
Wolfson v. Brammer, No. 3:06-cv-02357, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80770 (D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2006) (deny-
ing a preliminary injunction in a challenge to Arizona’s Pledges or Promises Clause), In re Kinsey, 
842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003) (upholding Florida’s Pledges or Promises Clause), and In re Watson, 794 
N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding New York’s Pledges or Promises Clause). 
 23. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of Pa, 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“[W]e cannot say that the state may not draw a line at the point where the coercive effect, or its ap-
pearance, is at its most intense—personal solicitation by the candidate.”); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 
40 (Or. 1991) (explaining that the ban mitigates not only the danger of the appearance of quid pro 
quo corruption, but also the prospect of coercion of lawyers and litigants into contributing). 
 24. Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, No. 06-725, 2007 WL 184801 (Ark. 
Jan. 25, 2007); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003). 
 25. Simes, No. 06-725, 2007 WL 184801, at *6. 
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struck down Georgia’s solicitation canon, baldly asserting “that the Su-
preme Court’s decision in White suggests that the standard for judicial 
elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and execu-
tive elections.”26  The Eleventh Circuit’s flagrant disregard for Justice 
Scalia’s cautionary words27 adds to the uncertain future of the canons. 
Finally, various canons designed to reduce partisanship in judicial 
elections or to constrain political activity by judges have come under 
fire.  On remand from the Supreme Court in White, the Eighth Circuit 
struck down clauses in Minnesota’s canons that were designed to pre-
serve the non-partisanship of the state’s judicial elections.28  Other 
courts, however, have upheld political activity canons designed to insu-
late sitting judges from politics unrelated to their own campaigns for re-
election.29 
The increasing and often successful attacks on this wide array of 
canons have left state bodies charged with regulating judicial conduct in 
disarray, especially when applying canons applicable to campaign con-
duct.30  As one trial court observed: “To say that there is considerable 
uncertainty regarding the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
White is an understatement. . . . It has caused, and will continue to 
cause, considerable uncertainty and consternation on the part of judicial 
candidates.”31  The broader White’s scope becomes, the greater will be 
the erosion of the traditional buffers between state judges and improper 
outside influences. 
Among such outside influences, perhaps the greatest cause of con-
sternation is large campaign contributions from attorneys and parties 
with business before state courts.  Wealthy special interests that are fre-
quent parties in litigation now can condition financial support for a can-
 
 26. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Republican Party of Minn. 
v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 765-66 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that Minnesota’s solicitation clause was un-
constitutional to the extent that it prohibited candidates from signing solicitation letters and making 
campaign appeals before large groups). 
 27. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 28. See White, 416 F.3d at 754-63. 
 29. See, e.g., In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003) (upholding the requirement that a judge 
resign before running for another office); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding restric-
tions on activities supporting campaigns other than the candidate’s own). 
 30. As a result, even in some states where canons have not been challenged in court, the fear of 
litigation has spawned the adoption of anticipatory amendments weakening the canons.  In July 2002, 
for example, a member of North Carolina’s Supreme Court served as the master of ceremonies for a 
Republican Party fundraising event and spoke in support of the Party’s candidates.  At the time, the 
action violated the state’s partisan political activity canon, as the justice later acknowledged.  Less 
than two months later, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court amended the state’s canons to 
permit judges to “attend, preside over, and speak at any political party gathering, meeting or other 
convocation” and engage in other political activity.  GASS, supra note 10, at 1.  North Carolina’s jus-
tices told one reporter that they had amended the state’s canons so as “to get ahead of a trend in fed-
eral court rulings and to avoid lawsuits over the state requirements.”  Matthew Eisley, Code Loosens 
Grip on Judges, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 20, 2003, at B1.  Likewise, the Georgia Supreme 
Court dropped Georgia’s Pledges or Promises Clause and its “ban on statements that ‘appear to 
commit’ a candidate.”  See GASS, supra note 10, at 4. 
 31. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1041-42 (D.N.D. 2005). 
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didate on the candidate’s willingness to take a particular stand on con-
tested legal or policy issues that will come before the court.  Candidates 
seeking campaign contributions can solicit support by announcing their 
allegiance to positions that prospective donors hope to advance through 
the courts.  Campaigns that once calmly focused on the qualifications 
and experience of the candidates have been transformed into multi-
million-dollar pitched battles, complete with highly personal attack 
ads.32  Often, the interest groups that are fueling the skyrocketing 
spending—principally the combatants in the war over “tort reform”—
are not transparent to the voters, who are instead courted through ex-
pensive television advertisements identifying candidates as “pro-life” or 
criticizing their decisions in criminal cases.33  Voters may be able to ob-
tain more information about candidates’ views, but the negative charac-
ter of the advertising and the extraordinary sums involved in the cam-
paigns are undermining trust in judges. 
In sum, when canons regulating political activity are stricken, the 
consequences are real.  Given the dynamics of modern political contests, 
the candidates face a prisoner’s dilemma: either they comport them-
selves in a manner that may be inconsistent with impartiality or risk al-
most certain defeat.  The effect is a surge in judicial campaign conduct 
(and other judicial conduct) that threatens judicial impartiality and the 
appearance of such impartiality.  With due process interests in severe 
jeopardy across the states, the recent petition for certiorari in Avery of-
fered hope that the Supreme Court would step in to safeguard them. 
B. The Meaning of Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. 
One of the most notorious judicial elections in recent history pre-
sented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to stem the unfortunate 
tide loosed by White, but the Court declined to take action.  In Avery, 
the plaintiffs sought recusal of a judge who received substantial financial 
support from individuals and organizations closely associated with the 
defendant.  To appreciate the import of the refusal to recuse, and the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to review that decision, requires some under-
 
 32. For a detailed account of these trends, see DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 (2005), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/ 
subpages/download_file_10569.pdf. 
 33. In the 2006 elections, for example, interest groups in the state of Washington spent more 
than a million dollars to influence Supreme Court races.  One sponsor, “Americans Tired of Lawsuit 
Abuse,” was plainly a group supporting business interests, but its ad featured the mother of a three-
year-old crime victim blaming the incumbent judge for the early release of her son’s murderer.  See 
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, STSUPCT/WA Atla Alexander Denouncement, 
http://brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_37254.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (re-
producing the ad’s storyboard). 
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standing of the underlying facts.34 
In May 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
Avery, an appeal from a class action verdict against State Farm of over 
$1 billion, including $456 million in contractual damages.  The appeal 
was not decided until after the November 2004 election, so the matter 
was pending throughout the 2004 campaign for a seat on the Illinois Su-
preme Court. 
Recognizing the high stakes of the race, a number of business 
groups and the Republican Party contributed heavily to the campaign of 
then-Circuit Judge Lloyd Karmeier, while the plaintiffs’ bar and the 
Democratic Party contributed heavily to the campaign of then-Illinois 
Appellate Judge Gordon Maag.  Together they raised $9.3 million in po-
litical contributions, a national record for a judicial election.35  Karmeier 
received more than $2 million from the Chamber of Commerce and 
more than $350,000 in direct contributions from State Farm’s employ-
ees, lawyers, and others involved with the company or the case.36  Maag, 
meanwhile, received nearly equal support from trial lawyers and labor 
organizations. 
The funds financed a contest illustrating all of the ill effects 
unleashed by White.  In his own campaign ads, Karmeier all but prom-
ised to “fix” the “medical malpractice crisis” of “phony lawsuits” against 
doctors and hospitals.  His interest group supporters accused Maag of 
taking half a million dollars from trial lawyers.  In turn, ads run by 
Maag’s backers claimed that Karmeier was “in the pocket of big busi-
ness” and HMOs, which could count on Karmeier’s support “as they 
outsource American jobs and eliminate healthcare for workers.”  Kar-
meier boasted that he presided over “the first death penalty conviction 
in St. Claire County during the modern era,” while the Democratic 
Party accused him of leniency toward a child molester.37 
In the end, Karmeier won both the fundraising battle and the elec-
tion.  Karmeier described the expense of the campaign as “obscene” and 
expressed unease about its impact on public trust in the courts, but his 
concern for appearances waned almost immediately upon election.  
Once seated on the Illinois high court, he refused to recuse himself from 
the Avery appeal.  Karmeier then cast the deciding vote on the breach 
of contract claims, overturning that verdict against State Farm.  The 
public, not to mention the opposing litigants, could be forgiven for ques-
 
 34. The following discussion of Avery draws on Brief of Amici Curiae 12 Organizations Con-
cerned About the Influence of Money on Judicial Integrity, Impartiality, and Independence in Sup-
port of Petitioners, Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. 1470 (2006) (No. 05-842) 
[hereinafter Avery Brief], and GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 32, at 18-19, 26-27. 
 35. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 32, at 18. 
 36. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Avery, 126 S. Ct. 1470 (No. 05-842). 
 37. Storyboards, providing video clips at four-second intervals and the full script of the ads, may 
be found at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_47458.pdf. 
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tioning whether justice was truly served.38 
Was Justice Karmeier’s decision unbiased?  Very possibly yes, but 
we will never know.  Overshadowing the merits of his decision is a single 
stark fact: without Karmeier’s vote, State Farm would have faced fur-
ther proceedings on claims valued at up to $456 million.  That result is 
either a coincidence or an impressive rate of return on State Farm’s in-
vestment.  Because we cannot know which it is, public trust in the courts 
invariably suffers.39 
The United States Supreme Court could have stepped in to restore 
public confidence.  It was asked to review Karmeier’s decision to sit on 
the case and to reevaluate whether due process required recusal under 
such extreme circumstances, but the Court declined review.40  Avery 
closed the door, at least for the time being, to a claim that the real or 
apparent bias created by large campaign contributions violates the right 
to due process under the federal Constitution.  And if the circumstances 
of Avery could not persuade the Court to intervene, it is even less likely 
that the Court will do so when campaign statements undermine confi-
dence in fair and impartial courts.  Avery thus leaves the responsibility 
for preserving the reality and appearance of impartial justice in elective 
 
 38. While it is impossible to prove the effects of campaign contributions on judicial decision-
making, a growing body of empirical evidence has found a significant correlation between the sources 
of a judge’s funds and the likelihood of outcomes favorable to those sources.  See, e.g., Stephen J. 
Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 583, 601-29 (2002) (finding a strong correlation between Alabama Supreme Court justices’ 
votes in arbitration cases and the sources of their campaign funding); Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, 
Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1 (reporting that over 
a twelve-year period Ohio Supreme Court justices voted in favor of their contributors more than sev-
enty percent of the time); see also RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL 
AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 6.4.1, at 180 (1996) (“While no empirical research appears to 
have been conducted on whether judicial campaign contributions have actually influenced the out-
comes of any cases, many people—including many judges—clearly believe that such is the case.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 39. See James Sample, The Campaign Trial: The True Cost of Expensive Court Seats, SLATE, 
Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2137529/; see also Brief for Business and Professional People 
for the Public Interest and Citizen Action/Illinois as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2-5, 
Price v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 S. Ct. 685 (2006) (No. 06-465) (explaining that Justice Karmeier also 
recently cast the deciding vote in reversing a $10.1 billion judgment against Philip Morris USA, a 
company that, along with a business lobbying group backing it, reportedly spent more than $1 million 
supporting Karmeier in the 2004 election); Editorial, Buying Justice?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 20, 2005, at B8 (“[T]he juxtaposition of gigantic campaign contributions and favorable judg-
ments for contributors creates a haze of suspicion over the highest court in Illinois. . . . Although Mr. 
Karmeier is an intelligent and no doubt honest man, the manner of his election will cast doubt over 
every vote he casts in a business case.  This shakes public respect for the courts and the law—which is 
a foundation of our democracy.”). 
 40. Two of the authors of this article contributed to an amicus brief co-signed by the Brennan 
Center for Justice, the Campaign Legal Center, and ten other organizations in support of certiorari in 
Avery.  See Avery Brief, supra note 34.  The brief asserted that the case “present[ed] an important 
opportunity for the Court to provide guidance as to the circumstances in which the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires recusal.”  Id. at 2. 
It should be noted that, while the potential harms raised by large campaign contributions apply 
only to state judicial elections, many of the due process protections provided by the canons also apply 
in the context of appointed state courts.  As in the more dramatic context of elective judiciaries, the 
current uncertainties surrounding those due process protections also militate in favor of guidance as 
to the circumstances in which due process may mandate recusal. 
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state courts squarely in the hands of those courts. 
With the canons of judicial conduct looking increasingly precarious 
in the wake of White, courts and litigants are left with precious few reli-
able mechanisms to safeguard the constitutional right to due process.  
Recusal is one such remaining safeguard, and, because it is tailored to 
the specific factual circumstances of the case at issue, it does not trigger 
the same First Amendment scrutiny as canons limiting political speech.41  
There is nothing radical about using recusal in this way; to the contrary, 
proponents of enhanced recusal and disqualification can draw on a long 
and venerable history. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The concept and practice of judicial disqualification are of ancient 
vintage.  Under medieval Jewish law, judges were barred from partici-
pating in any case in which a litigant was a friend, kinsman, or someone 
they disliked.42  The Roman Code of Justinian went further, permitting 
parties to remove judges for mere “suspicion” of bias.43  While the civil 
law ultimately incorporated the Justinian template into its system of 
“recusation,”44 still operative in many countries today, the common law 
took a much more constricted approach: “a judge was disqualified for 
direct pecuniary interest and for nothing else.”45  Early English courts 
distinguished between a judge’s interests and his biases, prejudices, or 
affinities, and categorically rejected the latter as grounds for disqualifi-
cation.  Into the nineteenth century, the guiding—and virtually exclu-
sive—precept of Anglo-American disqualification jurisprudence, es-
poused by Lord Coke in Dr. Bonham’s Case and seconded by 
Blackstone, was that “[n]o man shall be a judge in his own case.”46  In all 
 
 41. Drawing on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in White, courts that have invalidated canons 
regulating campaign speech, fundraising, or political activity have upheld canons mandating disquali-
fication when impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  See, e.g., Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879, 883 (N.D. Ind. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-4333 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 
2006); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan. 2006), appeal docketed, No. 06-
3290 (10th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006); Ala. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 
1080, 1083 (D. Ala. 2005); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021,1039 (D.N.D. 
2005); Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
 42. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 1.2.1, at 6 (citing THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK XIV: THE 
BOOK OF JUDGES 68-70 (Abraham M. Hershman trans., Yale Univ. Press 1949)); John Leubsdorf, 
Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 248 n.65 (1987) (same). 
 43. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 1.2.1, at 6 (summarizing the Justinian system); Harrington 
Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923) (translating the relevant provision of Justin-
ian’s Corpus Juris Civilis). 
 44. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 1.2.1-.2, at 6-7; Putnam, supra note 43, at 3. 
 45. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947). 
 46. Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.) (“aliquis non debit esse Judex in 
propria causa . . . .”); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986) (describing judi-
cial disqualification at common law); Frank, supra note 45, at 609-12 (same); Note, Disqualification 
of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1435-36 (1966) (same).  Blackstone 
famously wrote that “the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already 
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other circumstances, judges had a “duty to sit.”47 
Since that time, American rules on judicial disqualification have 
been steadily liberalized in three main ways.48  First, the list of disquali-
fying factors has expanded far beyond direct financial interest, so that in 
every jurisdiction it now encompasses bias, prejudice, partiality, familial 
and professional connections to the parties and their lawyers, knowl-
edge of disputed evidentiary facts, and improper conduct.49  Second, the 
rules have moved from requiring evidence of actual bias or interest for a 
claim of disqualification, to requiring only the appearance thereof.50  
And third, judges are now asked to evaluate these claims under objec-
tive rather than subjective standards—recusing themselves automati-
cally in certain instances, adopting the perspective of a “reasonable per-
son” in all others.51 
Through its Model Code of Judicial Conduct, first introduced in 
1972 and adopted in some form by nearly every state and by Congress,52 
the American Bar Association (ABA) has helped foster each of these 
 
sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption 
and idea.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361. 
 47. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 20.10, at 613-21; Marla N. Greenstein, Judicial Disqualification 
in Alaska Courts, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 53, 56 (2000). 
 48. America’s rules on judicial disqualification have, of course, evolved in manifold directions; 
we focus here on the three most fundamental substantive trends, spanning all United States jurisdic-
tions.  For more thorough histories of judicial disqualification in the United States, see FLAMM, supra 
note 38, at ch. 27 (summarizing state rules, with historical background interspersed); id. at ch. 23 (ex-
plaining the development of federal disqualification provisions); Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Ap-
pearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 537-50 (2005) 
(same); and Mark Andrew Grannis, Note, Safeguarding the Litigant’s Constitutional Right to a Fair 
and Impartial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign 
Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 387-96 (1987) (same).  See also Liljeberg v. 
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 849-50, 858-61 (1988) (examining the legislative intent 
behind 28 U.S.C. § 455, the primary federal disqualification statute). 
 49. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 1.4, at 12; Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppres-
sion: Due Process and the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 573-74 
(2004); Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 246-47.  See generally FLAMM, supra note 38, at chs. 23-27 (pro-
viding a detailed overview of disqualification rules in federal and state courts). 
 50. See M. Margaret McKeown, Don’t Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of Pro-
priety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 45 (2005) (“In most [recusal] cases, the issue is not an 
actual conflict of interest or a claim of actual bias, but rather the appearance of potential bias in hear-
ing a case where a judge’s impartiality is perceived to be in doubt.”); see also Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825 
(“The Due Process Clause may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would 
do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.  But to perform 
its high function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” (internal quotations 
and citation omitted)); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 565 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”) 
(quoting Lord Hewitt’s maxim, ubiquitous in Commonwealth jurisprudence, from Ex parte 
McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1923)). 
 51. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (2004); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, at 15 (2002) (noting that every 
circuit has adopted a reasonable person standard for applying § 455, the federal statutory analogue to 
Canon 3E(1)). 
 52. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 2.6.1-.2, at 43-44 (noting that “[a]doption of the 1972 version of 
the [ABA Model] Code has since been accomplished, in whole or in part, in virtually every state as 
well as in the District of Columbia” and in all federal courts save the Supreme Court); Leslie W. 
Abramson, The Judge’s Relative is Affiliated with Counsel of Record: The Ethical Dilemma, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1183 n.12 (2004) (asserting that “forty-nine states . . . have adopted some 
form of the ABA Code”). 
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trends.  The centerpiece of modern United States disqualification law is 
the Model Code’s Canon 3E, which stipulates that “[a] judge shall dis-
qualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartial-
ity might reasonably be questioned.”53  As commentators have noted, 
Canon 3E’s comprehensive concern for judicial impartiality “marks the 
curtailment, if not the demise” of the duty-to-sit doctrine.54  “While a 
judge still may have a duty to sit in cases where he or she is not disquali-
fied, there is an equally strong duty not to sit in cases where he or she is 
disqualified.”55 
The expansion of judicial disqualification law has tracked the ex-
pansion in social understandings of the judicial role.  Ever since the ad-
vent of Legal Realism, it has been untenable to see adjudication as “a 
mechanistic enterprise in which judges appl[y] the law and render[] de-
cisions without recourse to their own ideological or policy prefer-
ences.”56  To the contrary, political scientists now routinely use attitudi-
nal models to understand and predict judicial decision-making.57  Legal 
Realism also sensitized the public to the policymaking power of 
courts—their ability to make law as well as apply it—and to the possibil-
ity that this power would increase in lockstep with the legalization of 
American life.58 
As society came to appreciate the enormous influence of judges 
 
 53. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1).  Canon 3E(1)’s general standard, in 
particular, constitutes the core of modern disqualification law; per se rules vary significantly across 
jurisdictions and cover far less ground.  See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 38, § 2.6.5, at 50 (stating that 
“[t]he vast majority of judicial disqualification motions predicated on alleged Code violations have 
been based on [Canon 3E(1)’s general standard]”); Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 240 (identifying 
Canon 3E(1)’s general standard as the most pro-litigant “axiom” of federal disqualification doctrine); 
Matthew D. Besser, Note, May I Be Recused? The Tension Between Judicial Campaign Speech and 
Recusal After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197, 1216 (2003) (“The 
modern view of judicial disqualification is exemplified by Canon 3E(1) . . . .”). 
 54. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.02, at 109 (3d ed. 2000); 
accord Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 
MINN. L. REV. 657, 660-61 (1996). 
 55. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 109. 
 56. VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON 
FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 30 (2006) (describing the dominant pre-Legal Realism 
view of judging). 
 57. In attitudinal models, judges are assumed to act in accordance with their personal prefer-
ences; liberal judges will vote for the liberal outcome, conservative judges will vote for the conserva-
tive outcome, and so forth.  See, e.g., id. at 30-46 (explaining the basic attitudinal model and its pri-
macy in the social science literature); LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 5-21 (2006) (summarizing standard models of judicial behav-
ior and the evidence on their explanatory power). 
 58. Even the Supreme Court, which has a vested institutional interest in downplaying its poli-
cymaking discretion, see generally MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004), has recently “rec-
ognized that judges do engage in policymaking at some level.”  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 399 
n.27 (1991) (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1991)); see also Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (“Not only do state-court judges possess the power to 
‘make’ common law, but they have the immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well.”) 
(internal citation omitted).  As John Leubsdorf has observed, the public’s increased awareness “that 
judges do not simply resolve private disputes, but also shape and enforce governmental policy” has 
“give[n] litigants more reason to distrust even a judge with no stake in the result.”  Leubsdorf, supra 
note 42, at 250. 
46-503-GOLDBERG.DOC 5/17/2007  5:14 PM 
2007] The Best Defense 515 
and the diversity of their motives (its view of judicial psychology shifting 
“from the eighteenth century’s economic man, susceptible only to the 
tug of financial interest, to today’s Freudian person, awash in a sea of 
conscious and unconscious motives”),59 it became necessary to require 
disqualification for more than just pecuniary factors.  As society grew 
less and less confident in the ideal of judicial impartiality, it became 
necessary to allow disqualification not only for actual bias, which is of-
ten very difficult to prove, but also for the appearance of bias, which 
may be the best proxy for actual bias and in any event may be equally 
damaging to the judiciary’s reputation.  Objective standards were like-
wise needed to preserve public confidence and help steer judges away 
from self-interested or idiosyncratic recusal decisions.60 
Throughout American history, the great catalyst for disqualifica-
tion reform has been scandal.  The topic of disqualification, generally 
too technical, esoteric, and case-specific to attract widespread attention, 
comes onto the public radar when a prominent judge is attacked for im-
properly staying on a trial.61  Justice Scalia caused a major stir several 
years ago by refusing to recuse himself in Cheney v. United States Dis-
trict Court,62 despite his having gone duck-hunting with the petitioner 
Vice President several months before.63  But it is the White ruling more 
than any other development that now has the potential to alter the na-
ture and practice of judicial disqualification. 
After White, all candidates for judicial office must be allowed to 
announce their views, and in at least some jurisdictions to commit to an 
adjudicative stance, on disputed legal and political issues.  At the same 
time, there is enormous pressure for judicial campaigns to emulate other 
political campaigns in style and structure—with levels of television ad-
vertising, special interest involvement, and fundraising all rising precipi-
 
 59. Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 247. 
 60. Unsurprisingly, other common law countries have experienced a similar expansion in their 
disqualification regimes.  Commentators report that virtually all such countries now apply objective 
standards and allow appearance of bias to be disqualifying.  See Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Regulat-
ing Supreme Court Recusals, 2006 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 60, 60-61, 69-78 (summarizing judicial dis-
qualification principles in Commonwealth countries); R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck 
Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance & Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1814-28 (2005) (characterizing recusal policies in the courts of last resort 
of Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the United Kingdom). 
 61. See FLAMM, supra note 38, §§ 23.6.1, 28.3.2, at 678-80, 851-53 (describing Supreme Court 
recusal scandals); John P. Frank, Conflict of Interest and U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 18 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 744, 744 (1970) (“[S]hifts in the perception of conflicts of interest in general and disqualifi-
cation in particular come partly by . . . what might be described as political or public opinion jerks or 
jumps from especially newsworthy episodes.”); Frost, supra note 48, at 533-34 (“With each new scan-
dal or crisis has come a flurry of scholarship advocating an expansion of the grounds for disqualifica-
tion, and Congress has often responded by amending the recusal laws as suggested.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 62. 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
 63. See, e.g., Lori Ann Foertsch, Comment, Scalia’s Duck Hunt Leads to Ruffled Feathers: 
How the U.S. Supreme Court and Other Federal Judiciaries Should Change Their Recusal Ap-
proach, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 458-59, 469-79 (2006) (explaining the controversy and providing cita-
tions to media and scholarly criticisms of Scalia’s decision). 
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tously since 2000.64  As a result, judges will face more and more cases in 
which they have already suggested a preference for, if not a commit-
ment to, a particular outcome, and in which they have received signifi-
cant campaign contributions from one or more of the litigants. 
Recognizing the threat these developments pose to judicial impar-
tiality and due process, scholars have been furiously debating the proper 
relationship between judicial campaign activities and disqualification.65  
The ABA has revised its Model Code provisions.66  Courts and legisla-
tures may come next.  “The topic du jour,” one Ninth Circuit judge ob-
served in a recent speech, “is recusal.”67 
IV. THE LANDSCAPE OF AMERICAN DISQUALIFICATION LAW 
To be able to evaluate reform options for judicial disqualification, 
one must first understand how this body of law currently operates; in 
this Part, we summarize its basic features.  Disqualification law is some-
what difficult to characterize because, within a given state, constitutional 
provisions, statutes, court rules, judge-made doctrine, codes of judicial 
conduct (which may have the status of law or be merely hortatory), eth-
ics board rulings, and administrative directives may all provide legal au-
thority for removing a judge.68  Constitutions provide a baseline of due 
 
 64. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 32.  For additional information on the rise in 
television advertising, see Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Television Advertising 
About Judicial Selection, http://www.brennancenter.org/subpage.asp?key=38&init_key=9320 (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
 65. See, e.g., GASS, supra note 10, at 23-24 (discussing possible procedural and substantive re-
forms to strengthen recusal); Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 236-37 (2004) (urging state supreme courts and other 
responsible bodies to follow the Missouri Supreme Court and “consider shifting the enforcement of 
the pledge, promise, and commitment bans from sanctions for campaign statements that violate the 
canons to the requirement that judges recuse themselves from cases involving litigants or raising is-
sues that were the subjects of a campaign pledge, promise, or commitment”); Friedland, supra note 
49, at 632 (concluding that “carefully designed system[s] for judicial disqualification” can prevent 
elected judiciaries from having more serious due process problems than their appointed counter-
parts); Frost, supra note 48 (arguing that better procedures, not stricter substantive standards, are 
needed to invigorate disqualification law); Besser, supra note 53, at 1225-27 (recommending that the 
ABA clarify in the commentary to Canon 3E(1) that campaign statements permissible under the 
Code should be presumptively insufficient to require recusal); Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on 
Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (2006) (explaining how White will make it more difficult for self-professed 
“tough-on-crime” judges to be disqualified in criminal trials and urging states to liberalize their 
recusal provisions as a corrective). 
 66. See ABA JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 
REPORT (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/commissionreport.html [here-
inafter ABA REPORT]; see also Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States are Re-
sponding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 625, 646 (2005) (describing the recommendations of the ABA’s Standing Committee 
on Judicial Independence); McKeown, supra note 50, at 48 (“The [ABA] Commission [to Evaluate 
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct] is examining the disqualification standards in light of the in-
creased attention and sensitivity about recusal.”). 
 67. McKeown, supra note 50, at 45. 
 68. See FLAMM, supra note 38, at ch. 2 (describing the sources of disqualification law and their 
interrelationships).  The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and its state analogues can be seen as 
a form of ethics board ruling or administrative directive, albeit one that is far more comprehensive 
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process guarantees; the other sources give content to these guarantees 
and add grounds for disqualification.69  Procedures and standards often 
differ among courts in the same state—so that, for example, it will be 
easier to disqualify a judge at the trial court level than at the appellate 
level70—and they may also differ between civil and criminal trials,71 and 
between jury and bench trials.72 
The leading (indeed, the only) treatise on judicial disqualification 
concedes that “the theoretical underpinnings of American judicial dis-
qualification jurisprudence remain murky and unsettled,” its precedents 
“replete with inconsistencies.”73  Other prominent studies have found 
that “judicial disqualification frequently is subjective, random, and arbi-
trary,”74 that it rests on “a set of cloudy distinctions.”75  Functionally as 
well as conceptually, disqualification law is a sprawling patchwork, as 
 
and significant than the others. 
 69. Constitutions, accordingly, provide a weak basis for disqualification.  While the Supreme 
Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires “a fair trial in a fair tribunal,” In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), in which the judge “hold[s] the balance nice, clear, and true,” Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927), and that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Offutt v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), the Court has also stated that “only in the most extreme of 
cases would disqualification on [the basis of the Due Process Clause] be constitutionally required.”  
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986); see also id. at 828 (“The Due Process 
Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.”).  “Congress and the states,” 
the Court hastened to add, “of course[] remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial 
disqualification than those [mandated by the Constitution],” id., which is exactly what Congress and 
the states have done.  Cf. FLAMM, supra note 38, § 2.3.3, at 33-38 (explaining “why disqualification is 
not usually ordered on due process grounds”); Friedland, supra note 49, at 577-604 (analyzing in de-
tail when the Due Process Clause does and does not require disqualification for campaign state-
ments); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1083-99 (1996) (same, for the pre-White-era). 
 70. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 28.2.1-.2, at 845-47 (suggesting that procedures for bringing 
disqualification motions are often less favorable to movants at the appellate level).  There is some 
logic to the practice of making it easier to disqualify trial court judges than to disqualify appellate 
judges.  The former group hears many more cases, may be more likely to know the litigants and law-
yers who appear in their court, and—because significantly more likely to have reached the bench via 
popular election, rather than merit selection, see PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 252 (1980)—may be less insulated 
from politics and better able to dispense patronage.  It is by now a commonplace that “the potential 
for partiality and personality is greater” at the trial court level.  Id. (quoting Kathleen L. Barber, Se-
lection of Ohio Appellate Judges: A Case Study in Invisible Politics, in POLITICAL BEHAVIOR AND 
PUBLIC ISSUES IN OHIO 175, 185 (John J. Gargan & James G. Coke eds., 1972)). 
Specialized courts (bankruptcy, family law, small claims, municipal, etc.) and quasi-judicial per-
sonnel (magistrates, special masters, mediators, arbitrators, etc.) may be subject to distinctive dis-
qualification regimes, though the ABA Model Code is frequently applied to them as well.  SHAMAN 
ET AL., supra note 54, § 4.02, at 111.  Our focus in this article is on courts of general jurisdiction. 
 71. See FLAMM, supra note 38, §§ 1.5, 4.3, 28.6, at 13, 113, 876 (mentioning typical civil/criminal 
differentials); Note, State Procedures for Disqualification of Judges for Bias and Prejudice, 42 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 484, 485 (same).  Because concerns of due process are at their most compelling in criminal 
trials, a judge’s responsibility to recuse herself for actual or apparent bias may be heightened in the 
criminal context. 
 72. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 51, at 59 (noting that some courts have indicated they 
will be more likely to grant recusal requests in bench trials because of the judge’s greater role); 
FLAMM, supra note 38, § 4.7, at 140 (same).  Disqualification (and, when disqualification is initially 
denied, appellate relief) may also be easier to obtain in cases in which the judge sits alone, rather 
than on a panel.  Id. § 2.6.3, at 46. 
 73. FLAMM, supra note 38, § 1.6, at 14. 
 74. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 4-5 (1995). 
 75. Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 238 (discussing the federal disqualification regime). 
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thin as it is wide. 
A. Universal Features 
There are some important features of disqualification law, how-
ever, that are largely consistent across United States jurisdictions.  Per-
haps the most basic commonality is supplied by the ABA’s Canon 
3E(1): “[A] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”76  That 
general standard has been incorporated into federal law77 and the judi-
cial conduct codes of forty-seven states,78 and it offers the most expan-
sive ground for disqualification everywhere it appears.  Most of Canon 
3E’s specific rules on disqualification also apply nationwide: a judge 
should always recuse herself (or be disqualified) when she is biased 
against one of the parties,79 previously served as a lawyer in the matter 
in controversy,80 has an economic interest in the subject matter of 
greater than de minimis value,81 is related to a party or lawyer in the 
proceeding within the third degree of kinship,82 has personal knowledge 
of disputed evidentiary facts,83 or has made improper ex parte commu-
 
 76. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (2004); see supra notes 53-55 and ac-
companying text (explaining this provision’s central role in modern disqualification law). 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000). 
 78. The three states whose codes of judicial conduct lack this clause are Michigan, Montana, 
and Texas.  We do not count Wisconsin, whose code, incorporated in full into its Supreme Court 
rules, stipulates that “a judge shall recuse himself or herself in a proceeding . . . when reasonable, 
well-informed persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the justice system and 
aware of the facts and circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should know would reasonably 
question the judge’s ability to be impartial.”  WIS. SUP. CT. R. ch. 60.04(4).  Wisconsin thus explicitly 
appeals to a reasonable person who is “knowledgeable” and “well-informed,” but the substance of 
the standard is the same. 
Among the forty-seven states (and the District of Columbia) with codes of judicial conduct that 
include this clause, some follow the original ABA Model Code in using “should disqualify” instead of 
“shall disqualify.”  See Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 
VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 543 n.3 (1994) (discussing the ABA’s decision to replace “should” with “shall” 
in 1990); Abramson, supra note 52, at 1183-84 n.12 (listing sixteen states using “should” as of 2004).  
Yet even where state codes use “should,” most courts have interpreted the provision to have a man-
datory effect.  SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 54, § 4.02, at 110-11. 
In Michigan, Montana, and Texas, moreover, Canon 3E(1) may still offer a basis for disqualifi-
cation.  A January 2006 ruling by the Michigan Supreme Court featured one Justice proposing a new 
court rule that would incorporate this Canon, Adair v. State, 709 N.W.2d 567, 581-82 (Mich. 2006) 
(statement of Cavanagh, J.), while another justice forcefully protested the majority’s failure to apply 
it, id. at 584 (statement of Weaver, J.).  A dissent from a 1990 Montana Supreme Court ruling sug-
gested that Canon 3E(1) may require disqualification of a judge “[u]nder appropriate circumstances.”  
Washington v. Mont. Mining Props., Inc., 795 P.2d 460, 466 (Mont. 1990) (Sheehy, J., dissenting).  
The argument for Texas is more straightforward: its rules of civil procedure expressly incorporate 
Canon 3E(1).  See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(2)(a); see also TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 
cmt. (2002) (“A statement made during a campaign for a judicial office, whether or not prohibited by 
this Canon, may cause a judge’s impartiality to be reasonably questioned in the context of a particu-
lar case and may result in recusal.”). 
 79. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(a). 
 80. Id. Canon 3E(1)(b). 
 81. Id. Canon 3E(1)(c). 
 82. Id. Canon 3E(1)(d). 
 83. See generally FLAMM, supra note 38, at ch. 12.  See also id. § 12.1, at 335 & n.8 (noting that 
courts have interpreted Canon 3E’s general standard as prescribing disqualification when the judge 
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nications during the course of the proceeding.84  These per se rules are 
largely commonsensical and, except at the margins, uncontroversial. 
Certain disqualification doctrines are similarly universal.  The “rule 
of necessity”—when no impartial judge is available, the original judge(s) 
assigned to the case may take it—always trumps.85  Blanket and class-
based disqualification challenges are disfavored.86  It is more difficult to 
disqualify a judge for bias against an attorney than for bias against a 
party.87  To be disqualifying, the actual or apparent bias of the judge 
must be directly relevant to the proceeding at issue,88 and the “bias must 
be personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature.”89  The latter distinction is 
often analyzed under the “extrajudicial source rule,” which holds that 
unless it is so pervasive or egregious as to “display a deep-seated favorit-
ism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible,” bias that 
stems directly from the case proceedings will not be disqualifying.90 
In all (for-cause) disqualification motions, the evidentiary and per-
suasive burdens rest with the movant; judicial bias, partiality, and inter-
est are never presumed.91  These burdens are heavy—to prevail, the 
movant “ordinarily must adduce facts that would raise significant doubt 
as to whether justice would be done in the case.”92  On appeal, odds of 
 
“has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts”). 
 84. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7); FLAMM, supra note 38, at ch. 14. 
 85. The rule of necessity is absolute when it applies, and “can be justified only by strict and im-
perious necessity.”  Annotation, Necessity as Justifying Action by Judicial or Administrative Office 
Otherwise Disqualified To Act in Particular Case, 39 A.L.R. 1476, 1479 (1925).  It has been in use 
since at least 1430.  See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980). 
 86. These are challenges that seek to remove a judge from hearing all cases of a certain type.  
An example of a blanket disqualification challenge would be an attorney’s request that a judge be 
disqualified from hearing all cases brought by her firm or a public defender’s request that a judge be 
disqualified from hearing all capital cases.  An example of a class-based challenge would be a motion 
to remove a judge for her racism.  Both types of challenges violate the case-by-case method and the 
“strong presumption that those who sit in a judicial capacity are disinterested, impartial, and unbi-
ased in all matters that come before them,” FLAMM, supra note 38, § 19.9, at 573-74 (internal citations 
omitted), and so are rarely upheld.  See id. § 3.5.3, at 66-72 (summarizing blanket challenges); id. § 
4.5, at 126-29 (summarizing claims of class bias); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 54, § 4.08, at 125 (noting 
that “courts are highly reluctant to grant blanket disqualification” and providing examples). 
 87. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 4.4, at 114-26; SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 54, § 4.08, at 122-24. 
 88. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 4.6.1, at 132. 
 89. See id. §§ 4.3, 4.6.1, at 112, 131 (citations omitted); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 54, § 4.04, at 
113. 
 90. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 
384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (applying the extrajudicial source rule); FLAMM, supra note 38, § 4.6, at 129-
40 (explaining the rule); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 54, § 4.05, at 115-17 (same).  There is some de-
bate over the coherence and manageability of this doctrine—critics point out the difficulties in de-
termining what is extrajudicial versus intrajudicial and ask why this distinction should be so deci-
sive—but it remains good law. 
 91. FLAMM, supra note 38, § 19.9, at 573; Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 241-42. 
 92. FLAMM, supra note 38, § 19.9, at 575-76.  Different courts have defined the evidentiary bur-
den in different ways—demanding, for example, a showing of “compelling evidence, substantial evi-
dence, or a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. § 19.9, at 576-77.  In some jurisdictions, a judge must 
take as true the facts alleged in support of a disqualification motion, whereas in others judges may be 
permitted, or may even have the duty, to assess the validity of these facts.  Id. § 19.3.1, at 559-62.  Ju-
risdictions also differ as to whether the actions of a disqualified judge are void or merely voidable.  
Id. § 22.4.2, at 653-55.  All of these distinctions, however, are minor compared to the uniformity in 
the allocation (to the movant) and degree (onerous) of the burden of proof. 
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success are even worse.  Nearly every appellate court, state and federal, 
will overturn a lower court’s disqualification or recusal decision only for 
an “abuse of discretion.”93 
More directly relevant to the White ruling, it is extremely difficult 
to disqualify a judge either for having received a campaign contribution 
from one of the parties or their lawyers, or for having previously ex-
pressed a position on a legal or political issue implicated by the case.  
Since 1999, the ABA has included in Canon 3E a provision prescribing 
disqualification of an elected judge when: 
the judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party or a 
party’s lawyer has within the previous [***] year[s] made aggregate con-
tributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that is greater than [[ 
[$***] for an individual or [$***] for an entity] ]] [[is reasonable and ap-
propriate for an individual or an entity]].94 
Yet in the subsequent years, no states have adopted this provision.  One 
state (Alabama) had a similar policy in place at the time of the ABA’s 
revision,95 but it appears to be rarely applied.96  The ABA position is 
 
 93. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 32.1, at 999-1000 (“This ‘abuse of discretion’ standard is gen-
erally employed both by state appellate courts and by the various federal circuit courts of appeal, and 
it is typically applied in both civil and criminal proceedings.” (citations omitted)); FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., supra note 51, at 65 (claiming that an abuse of discretion standard is used in every federal cir-
cuit except for the Seventh, which reviews disqualification appeals de novo); see also FLAMM, supra 
note 38, § 1.10.1, at 20 (asserting that appellate courts “tend to view judicial disqualification inquiries 
as both difficult and distasteful” (citations omitted)); id. §§ 31.4-.7, at 975-91 (summarizing the proce-
dural mechanisms for appealing a disqualification decision and noting that state and federal courts 
rarely grant such appeals, whether made through interlocutory order, motion for reconsideration, or 
post-trial petition); PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW 
AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 19-20 (1990) (highlighting the deferential nature of 
appellate review regarding recusal).  The abuse of discretion standard is typical of appellate review of 
conclusions of fact in the American legal system, whereas conclusions of law are generally reviewed 
de novo.  (The scrutiny applied to mixed findings of fact and law will depend on the issue at ques-
tion.)  See Lisa M. White, Comment, A Wrong Turn on the Road to Tort Reform: The Supreme 
Court’s Adoption of De Novo Review in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 885, 904 (2003). 
 94. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(e) (2004) (brackets in original).  “Ag-
gregate contributions” are meant to include both direct and indirect gifts made to a candidate.  Id. at 
Terminology.  In its suggested revisions to the Model Code, an ABA commission recently recom-
mended adding “or the law firm of a party’s lawyer” to the phrase “a party [or a] party’s lawyer.”  
ABA REPORT, supra note 66, Rule 2.11(A)(4). 
 95. ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(c) (Replacement 2005); cf. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23-24, 
Jones v. Burnside, 127 S. Ct. 576 (2006) (No. 06-53) (identifying Alabama as the only state with a 
similar provision to the ABA’s Canon 3E(1)(e)); Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: 
Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667, 675 & n.28 (2001) (identifying Alabama as the only state 
that clearly requires elected judges to recuse or be disqualified when faced with major contributors 
and arguing that disqualification in these instances should be automatic).  Mississippi has added a 
provision to its Code of Judicial Conduct indicating that “[a] party may file a motion to recuse a 
judge based on the fact that an opposing party or counsel of record for that party is a major donor to 
the election campaign of such judge” and stipulating that such motions will be evaluated like any 
other recusal motion.  MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(2) (2002).  As if to clarify how 
dramatically this provision falls short of the ABA’s Canon 3E(1)(e), the official commentary notes 
that “[t]his provision does not appear in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.”  Id. Canon 
3E(2) cmt. 
 96. See Val Walton, Suit Claims Governor, AG Not Enforcing Campaign Law, BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS, Aug. 2, 2006, at 2B; see also Finley v. Patterson, 705 So. 2d 834, 835 n.1 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., 
concurring) (describing the enforcement of section 12-24-2 of the Alabama Code as being “in legal 
limbo” because it was not precleared under the Voting Rights Act); Brackin v. Trimmier Law Firm, 
897 So. 2d 207, 230-34 (Ala. 2004) (Brown, J., statement of nonrecusal) (stating, “I am not aware of 
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not just ignored; it is inverted in the prevailing jurisprudence, in which 
motions to disqualify a judge for campaign contributions “hardly ever 
succeed.”97  Motions to disqualify because a party or attorney has pro-
vided other types of campaign support, such as public endorsement or 
participation on the judge’s campaign staff, have met a similar fate.98  
Motions to disqualify for failure to contribute money, time, or support 
to a judge’s election campaign have fared even worse.99 
The White decision may be expected to increase not only the vol-
ume of judicial campaign contributions, but also the volume of judicial 
campaign speech expressing a position on disputed issues likely to come 
before the court.  As Commitment Clauses and Pledges or Promises 
Clauses are rescinded or invalidated, judicial campaign promises will be 
“unavoidable” as well.100  Yet on account of the “strong presumption 
against disqualifying a judge” for her views on law or policy,101 recusal 
will rarely be required because of something the judge has said.  Except 
when they have expressed a clear, prejudicial view on a particular party 
appearing before the court or the merits of a particular case, judges will 
normally have no obligation to recuse for statements they have made on 
the campaign trail.102 
 
any opinions in which this Court has resolved the issue of the enforceability of §§ 12-24-1 and -2,” 
and refusing to recuse despite contributions of more than $50,000 from an amicus curiae PAC affili-
ated with one of the parties). 
 97. John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 69, 87 (2003) (citing numerous examples); accord FLAMM, supra note 38, § 6.4.1, at 184-
85; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Reversal at 1, Republican Party of 
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521) (describing Public Citizen’s unsuccessful challenge 
to Texas’s system, “which allows large campaign contributions by lawyers and others with interests 
before the courts but does not require recusal of judges when contributors appear before them”).  
Professor Nagle notes that academia has sided squarely with the ABA on this issue: “Indeed, the 
scholarly opinion is just as unanimous that a campaign contribution should require a judge to recuse 
as the courts are agreed that recusal is unnecessary.”  Nagle, supra, at 88 (providing citations to 
scholarly critiques). 
Courts have been more sympathetic to disqualification motions when the campaign contribution 
at issue is particularly large, particularly close in time to the proceeding, or supplemented by addi-
tional campaign activity.  See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 798 (Okla. 2001) (indicating that the 
size, timing, and manner of judicial campaign contributions may be relevant to the disqualification 
determination); MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1338 n.5 (Fla. 1990) 
(“Although a motion for disqualification based solely upon a legal campaign contribution is not le-
gally sufficient, it may well be that such a contribution, in conjunction with some additional factor, 
would constitute legally sufficient grounds for disqualification upon motion.”). 
 98. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 6.4.3, at 191-94. 
 99. See id. § 6.5, at 194-96.  Some courts have denied disqualification when the moving party or 
her counsel did “not merely provide political support to the judge’s opponent,” but in fact was the 
opponent.  Id. § 6.5, at 195-96. 
 100. Friedland, supra note 49, at 620. 
 101. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 10.2, at 293-94; id. § 10.4, at 296-97 (“[I]t has generally been 
agreed that, for a judge’s prejudgment to warrant disqualification, it must go directly to his personal 
appraisal of a party appearing before him or to the merits of a particular case, and must result in the 
judge’s mind becoming ‘irrevocably closed’ on the issues as they arise in the context of a specific 
case.” (citations omitted)).  See generally id. §§ 10.1-.7, at 290-303 (synopsizing the disqualification 
rules for judges’ remarks on legal and political matters). 
 102. Recognizing as much, an ABA commission recently recommended an addition to the Model 
Code prescribing disqualification when: 
The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in 
a court proceeding, judicial decision or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the 
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B. Differential Features 
Other features of judicial disqualification law vary substantially 
across United States jurisdictions.  The most meaningful distinction is 
that in about one-third of the states, litigants may disqualify a judge 
without showing cause.103  This is known as peremptory disqualifica-
tion.104  It harks back to the Code of Justinian and its policy of allowing 
parties to “recuse” judges they deemed “under suspicion.”105  When 
peremptory challenges are denied for a procedural deficiency or are no 
longer available—such challenges are usually capped at one per pro-
ceeding106—litigants retain the right to seek recusal or disqualification 
for cause. 
Among for-cause jurisdictions (and in peremptory jurisdictions 
when challenges are made for cause), the crucial distinctions tend to be 
procedural, not substantive.  While jurisdictions differ as to the specific 
situations calling for disqualification and the specific requirements for a 
successful motion, the standards and doctrines that courts apply tend to 
be functionally the same.107  More notable, and probably more conse-
quential, are differences in the methods courts use for handling a recusal 
or disqualification motion—a topic on which the Model Code is silent.  
Some courts require the challenged judge to transfer these motions im-
mediately to a colleague (a presiding judge or chief judge chooses which 
 
judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or contro-
versy. 
ABA REPORT, supra note 66, Rule 2.11(A)(5). 
 103. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 3.1, at 59 (stating that “a substantial minority of states[,] most . 
. . either midwestern or western,” have adopted peremptory rules); Friedland, supra note 49, at 615 
(“About a third of the states already provide for . . . peremptory disqualification.”); Leubsdorf, supra 
note 42, at 240 n.13 (reporting that, as of 1987, seventeen states had statutory provisions allowing 
peremptory disqualification).  See generally FLAMM, supra note 38, at ch. 3 (providing an overview of 
peremptory disqualification).  For an example of a representative peremptory statute, see ALASKA 
STAT. 22.20.022(a) (2005) (“If a party or a party’s attorney in a district court action or a superior 
court action, civil or criminal, files an affidavit alleging under oath the belief that a fair and impartial 
trial cannot be obtained, the presiding district court or superior court judge, respectively, shall at 
once, and without requiring proof, assign the action to another judge of the appropriate court in that 
district, or if there is none, the chief justice of the supreme court shall assign a judge for the hearing 
or trial of the action.  The affidavit must contain a statement that it is made in good faith and not for 
the purpose of delay.”). 
At the federal level, 28 U.S.C. § 144 appears to dictate peremptory disqualification for charges 
of personal bias or prejudice in district courts, but the Supreme Court has interpreted § 144 so as to 
require “fair support” for all such charges, Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33 (1921), and dis-
qualification has rarely been sought or obtained under this statute.  FLAMM, supra note 38, § 25.8, at 
737-38; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3541, at 551 (2d 
ed. 1984).  Critics have assailed the Court’s interpretation of § 144 as subverting a clear congressional 
intent to allow peremptory disqualification.  See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in 
the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1224 (2002); Frank, supra note 45, at 629; Frost, 
supra note 48, at 543-44. 
 104. Peremptory disqualification, it should be noted, may be implemented any number of ways.  
Among jurisdictions that offer it, there are significant disparities regarding whether and what kind of 
affidavit must be filed, the strictness or liberality with which judges will interpret the controlling stat-
utes, and the rules on timeliness, waiver, and review.  See FLAMM, supra note 38, §§ 3.7-.17, at 74-102. 
 105. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 106. FLAMM, supra note 38, § 3.9.2, at 80-81. 
 107. See supra Part IV.A; supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text. 
46-503-GOLDBERG.DOC 5/17/2007  5:14 PM 
2007] The Best Defense 523 
colleague);108 some require transfer only after the challenged judge has 
ensured the motion’s timeliness and sufficiency; the rest let the chal-
lenged judge decide on these motions herself.109  Most state and federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court,110 follow the latter policy and 
rarely, if ever, require transfer.111  Nor is voluntary transfer typical.112  
Likewise, while some jurisdictions encourage or require challenged 
judges to hold evidentiary hearings, most leave the decision of whether 
to do so entirely to the judge’s discretion.113  With or without hearings, 
judges in most—though again, not all—jurisdictions do not need to give 
a reasoned explanation for their recusal decisions.114  In practice, judges 
have been much more likely to give reasons when they decline to recuse 
themselves.115 
Another important distinction, discussed in Part II above, is exter-
nal to disqualification law: how jurisdictions select their judges and regu-
late their behavior outside the courtroom.  Among the states with 
elected judiciaries, campaign practices vary along a host of dimensions, 
from fundraising and spending regulations,116 to speech restrictions 
(though these may be converging on account of White), to levels of spe-
 
 108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020(a)(9); UTAH R. CIV. P. 63(b)(2)-(3) (2005); VT. R. CIV. 
P. 40(e)(3) (2006). 
 109. See Abramson, supra note 78, at 545-58 (explaining these three methods and their subvari-
ants). 
 110. Judicial disqualification raises particularly vexing issues at the Supreme Court level, where 
there is no possibility of review by a higher court or (under current law) substitution of justices, and 
where the removal of a justice creates the possibility of an equally divided Court.  Many have criti-
cized the federal Supreme Court’s laissez-faire recusal policies.  See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal 
and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657 (2005); Olowofoyeku, supra note 60; Caprice L. Rob-
erts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Re-
sort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 
BROOK. L. REV. 589 (1987); Foertsch, supra note 63; Timothy J. Goodson, Comment, Duck Duck 
Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal Practices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney 
v. United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181 (2005); Pearson, supra note 60; Christopher Rif-
fle, Note, Ducking Recusal: Justice Scalia’s Refusal To Recuse Himself from Cheney v. United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), and the Need for a Unique Recusal 
Standard for Supreme Court Justices, 84 NEB. L. REV. 650 (2005).  Because the Supreme Court’s dis-
qualification practices raise such discrete concerns and are already scrutinized by the media and the 
legal community at great depth, we focus in this article only on lower courts. 
 111. On the rarity of transfers in federal courts, see Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 
F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1992); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 51, at 44; Frost, supra note 48, at 571-
72; Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 236, 266 (1978).  On the rarity of transfers in state courts, see FLAMM, supra note 38, § 
17.5.1, at 516-17; Abramson, supra note 78, at 547 (counting twenty-seven states as of 1994 that rest 
recusal decisions “within the sound discretion of the challenged judge”). 
 112. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 17.5.1, at 516-17; Frost, supra note 48, at 571-72. 
 113. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 17.6, at 523-35; Abramson, supra note 78, at 555-58; Frost, su-
pra note 48, at 569-70. 
 114. See MCFADDEN, supra note 93, at 19; Frost, supra note 48, at 569-70; Leubsdorf, supra note 
42, at 244-45. 
 115. See Frost, supra note 48, at 570-71; Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 244-45 (“Published opinions 
. . . form an accumulating mound of reasons and precedents against withdrawal; meanwhile, some 
judges routinely and silently disqualify themselves in comparable cases.”). 
 116. See generally ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 
(2d ed. 2005); BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, WRITING REFORM: A 
GUIDE TO DRAFTING STATE & LOCAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS (Deborah Goldberg ed., rev. ed. 
2004). 
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cial interest involvement, advertising, and partisan rancor.  Thus, even 
though two states may have disqualification regimes that look quite 
similar on the books, in application one state’s courts might face sys-
tematically different—and more troubling—issues on account of its ju-
dicial elections and the financial and political pressures they entail. 
C. The Current State of Judicial Recusal: Underuse and 
Underenforcement 
Unfortunately, there appear to be no systematic empirical studies 
on the success rates of disqualification motions or the circumstances in 
which recusal occurs.  Such research is stymied by the lack of a written 
record on most recusal decisions.  But there are several reasons to be-
lieve that disqualification provisions are systematically underused and 
underenforced. 
First, motions for disqualification are likely to be underused by par-
ties because they are costly and risky.  Paying clients may not wish to in-
cur the additional litigation costs of filing the motion, especially if the 
prospects for success appear low.  As a rule, the heavy evidentiary and 
persuasive burdens demanded of movants will generate steep odds 
against disqualification at the trial level, and steeper odds on review.117  
And the fear of angering the judge with an unsuccessful motion—which 
may apply especially to lawyers who are likely to appear before the 
judge in other cases—may deter the filing from the start.118 
Second, several of the current doctrines concerning recusal make it 
likely that disqualification provisions are underenforced.  Allowing 
judges to decide challenges to their own impartiality is not a policy cal-
culated to promote vigorous enforcement.119  Transferring the motion to 
 
 117. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text; see also Shepard, supra note 69, at 1080 (ob-
serving that “even a casual perusal of the cases decided under the federal statute”—which is similar 
in substance to many state statutes— “demonstrates that only the very most outrageous behavior is 
sufficient to win a recusal”). 
 118. See ALAN J. CHASET, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE 58 (1981) (noting that “[j]udges, like other persons, are likely to resent charges of 
bias”); Howard J. Bashman, Recusal on Appeal: An Appellate Advocate’s Perspective, 7 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 59, 68 (2005) (“[An] unsuccessful[] recusal request could cause the appellate judge 
to harbor resentment toward the party which claimed that the appellate judge was incapable of being 
fair.  After all, judges are only human.  And therefore, a recusal request that unsuccessfully chal-
lenges the perception of a judge’s impartiality can serve as a self-fulfilling prophesy.”); id. at 74 (“[A] 
party should move to disqualify an appellate judge only when disqualification is guaranteed to result.  
This is because the only thing worse than an appellate judge whose impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned is an appellate court that might well resent a party’s attempt, without a convincing basis, 
to disqualify a judge from ruling on the merits of a case.”); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Mat-
ter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 622 (2002) 
(“Although recusal motions are filed against Justices on the Court, most litigants do not seek dis-
qualification . . . because to do so suggests a lack of confidence in a Justice’s ability to evaluate the 
issues objectively.”); Stephen L. Wasby, Recusal of Federal Judges: A Discussion of Recent Cases, 14 
JUST. SYS. J. 525, 530-31 (1991) (discussing the risks of judicial “retribution” following a denied 
recusal motion). 
 119. Beyond the obvious sense in which this practice might seem to contravene the maxim that 
“no man shall be a judge in his own case,” see supra note 46 and accompanying text, R. Matthew 
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friendly colleagues on the same court, while an improvement over de-
ciding one’s own case, may not substantially improve the situation.  
Moreover, the fact that judges generally are required neither to hold 
hearings on the claim nor to give reasons for their decisions makes it 
easy for them to reject meritorious disqualification motions with impu-
nity. 
Third, research on social psychology shows that much bias is un-
conscious and that people tend to underestimate and undercorrect for 
their own biases and conflicts of interest.120  Thus, even a judge trying 
conscientiously to decide a motion for her recusal may be unable to ap-
preciate biases apparent to more objective observers.  Given current 
levels of homogeneity in the judiciary, it might also be the case that ap-
pellate judges will share certain unexamined biases that will impair their 
ability to operate as a corrective. 
V. INVIGORATING JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: TEN POTENTIAL 
REFORMS 
Having outlined the growing threats to judicial independence and 
impartiality—and the inadequacy of judicial disqualification, as cur-
rently utilized, to combat these threats—we consider in this Part some 
possible solutions.  It would be impractical (not to mention tedious) to 
evaluate in detail the merits of every option, so here we offer ten pro-
posals with the potential to invigorate dramatically the protections of-
fered by disqualification.  Section A suggests nine possible reforms to 
systems of disqualification that courts could implement unilaterally—
what we will call internal solutions.  Section B suggests one reform that 
citizens might undertake even without the imprimatur of the courts—
what we will call an external solution.  We make no claim to the origi-
nality of our list, but it offers an array of recusal reform options for 
courts interested in preserving their independence by embracing greater 
accountability. 
 
Pearson notes that “asking a challenged Justice to rule on a motion to recuse puts that Justice in a 
precarious position. . . . [B]ecause a Justice is expected to recuse himself sua sponte if there is a rea-
sonable apprehension of bias, a successful motion to recuse requires the Justice to admit that he 
failed in the first instance to adhere to statutory and ethical requirements.”  Pearson, supra note 60, 
at 1833-34. 
One empirical study of 571 state court judges in Arkansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Ohio 
regarding their disposition to disqualify themselves under a range of circumstances seemed to suggest 
a general judicial hostility toward recusal.  Almost three-fourths of the respondents indicated a high 
level of ambivalence about disqualification across all of the questions raising the issue.  SHAMAN & 
GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 74. 
 120. See, e.g., Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing 
Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, 
MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005); Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity 
in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCH. REV. 
781 (2004).  Professor Debra Lyn Bassett has probed the relevance of these findings for judicial dis-
qualification in Bassett.  Bassett, supra note 103, at 1248-51; Bassett, supra note 110, at 661-71. 
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As a preliminary matter, we recognize that all of these proposals 
require tradeoffs among the benefits and risks they present.  On the one 
hand, strengthening disqualification rules may be a means to safeguard 
due process and public trust in the judiciary.121  On the other hand, 
strengthening these rules may increase administrative burdens and liti-
gation delays, open new avenues for strategic behavior (such as judge 
shopping), and undermine a judge’s duty to hear all cases.  These trade-
offs demand that any solution be carefully designed and implemented, 
and we do not mean to minimize that task by providing only a cursory 
sketch of each reform option.  But the looming crisis created by White 
and exacerbated by Avery means that reform is no longer an option; it is 
a necessity. 
A. Nine Internal Solutions 
Invigorating recusal standards in any particular jurisdiction is 
unlikely to require acceptance of all of the proposals we describe.  In-
deed, some of the procedures we recommend are already in place in 
some states.122  Implementing certain suggestions would obviate the 
need for others.  The value of each reform will depend upon the context 
into which it is introduced. 
1. Peremptory Disqualification 
Just as the parties on both sides of criminal trials are permitted to 
strike a certain number of people from their jury pool without showing 
cause, so might litigants be allowed peremptory challenges of judges.  
About a third of the states already permit counsel to strike one judge 
per proceeding.123  Peremptory disqualification has the potential to in-
crease substantially the frequency of disqualification, and it denies 
judges the opportunity to defend themselves against charges of partial-
ity.  Its great advantage, though, lies in its simplicity: by granting liti-
gants one “free pass,” peremptory disqualification allows most of them 
to secure an unbiased judge without the expense, unseemliness, and ret-
ribution risk of a disqualification challenge.  If the next-assigned judge is 
 
 121. Sometimes one hears the argument that disqualification rules concerned with minimizing 
the appearance of bias will have the perverse effect of distracting attention from more pressing issues 
of actual bias, of elevating appearance over reality.  See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judi-
cial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2004).  This line of argument, in our view, slights the instru-
mental value of avoiding the appearance of bias both for preserving public confidence in the judiciary 
(and in public institutions more generally) and, more basically, for rooting out actual bias that would 
otherwise be undetectable. 
 122. Systematic comparative research into the usage and efficacy of the various policies already 
in place is sadly lacking. 
 123. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (describing peremptory disqualification).  
There is also a federal peremptory disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 144, but the Supreme Court 
has vitiated its significance by requiring “fair support” for all motions brought under it.  See supra 
note 103. 
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also unsatisfactory, the litigant may challenge her for cause. 
Opponents of peremptory disqualification have typically raised two 
main arguments against it: that it will lead to “abuses”—instances in 
which the litigant exercises a peremptory strike not out of sincere due 
process concerns but rather because the assigned judge seems unfavor-
able—and that it will burden judicial administration.124  Abuse is always 
a risk, but the criticism applies equally to peremptory challenges of ve-
nirepersons, which we nevertheless use to promote confidence in the 
jury’s fairness.  Jurisdictions may be able to deter peremptory challenges 
of judges for truly ungrounded or offensive reasons by requiring an affi-
davit explaining the challenge.125 
Some amount of administrative disruption is likewise inevitable.  
But by capping peremptory challenges at one per proceeding and re-
quiring them to be made at an early stage (before the removed judge 
has invested time and energy familiarizing herself with the case), disrup-
tion can be kept to a minimum.  Against these costs, the great appeal of 
peremptory disqualification is that of all the plausible reforms it pro-
vides the most straightforward, robust protection of judicial impartiality. 
2. Enhanced Disclosure 
In the wake of the White decision, enhanced disclosure might be 
one of the simplest and most important reforms available.  Judicial can-
didates now are more likely to make campaign statements on controver-
sial legal and policy questions.  Some of those statements—particularly 
when they reflect express or implied promises about how the judge will 
decide certain classes of cases—might support reasonable doubts about 
the judge’s impartiality.  Judges could be required to file with their 
clerk’s office copies or transcripts of all campaign advertising and state-
ments, which the court could then make available for public inspection 
by parties in a case.  Without such disclosure requirements, the burdens 
of tracking down such information may be prohibitive for many liti-
gants. 
Similarly, judges could be required to disclose information about 
their campaign finances.  Although campaign finance laws in every state 
now mandate reporting of campaign contributions and expenditures,126 
the stringency and enforcement of disclosure provisions vary widely.  
 
 124. See Bassett, supra note 103, at 1254. 
 125. See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 3.8, at 76-79 (describing peremptory disqualification jurisdic-
tions that require the filing of a timely motion, a supportive affidavit, and a certification of good faith 
in order for disqualification to be granted). 
 126. See Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign 
Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 471 (1988) (“All fifty states and the District of Columbia require 
candidates for elective office to file reports disclosing all campaign contributions and, for contribu-
tions over a certain amount, the names of contributors.”). 
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Even when disclosure rules are sound, moreover, information about a 
particular judge may be difficult to obtain.  In states with canons pro-
scribing the direct solicitation of contributions by judicial candidates, 
the court clerk’s office might be asked to provide the parties with cam-
paign finance reports, so that these disclosures do not vitiate efforts by 
conscientious judges to insulate themselves from the potentially distort-
ing influence of that information. 
More generally, judges could be required to disclose orally or in 
writing, at the outset of the litigation, any facts that might plausibly be 
construed as bearing on the judges’ impartiality.  Such a mandatory dis-
closure scheme would shift some of the costs of disqualification-related 
fact finding from the litigant to the state.  It would also increase the re-
putational and professional cost to judges who fail to disclose pertinent 
information that later emerges through another source. 
Objections to this proposal might emphasize the added burden on 
judges or clerks, the potential intrusiveness on judges’ privacy, and the 
low probability that judges would disclose many of the most relevant 
facts.  (For example, no one will say, “I am a racist” or “I feel beholden 
to the trial lawyers who supported my campaign.”)  The practical bur-
den on judges is small, however, and the marginal cost to their privacy is 
slighter still, because judges already have an ethical obligation to dis-
close pertinent facts, even if this obligation has not been formalized into 
a legal rule.127  While it may be true that no disclosure policy could force 
judges to disclose their biases and interests when they are unwilling to 
do so (or are ignorant of their existence), this weakness is not an argu-
ment against enhanced disclosure; it just indicates that enhanced disclo-
sure is a partial solution.  Disclosure is also an incomplete solution in 
the sense that it provides only the grounds for disqualification; it does 
not guarantee that a judge will recuse herself when the grounds are 
made known. 
3. Per Se Rules for Campaign Contributors 
To address the concern about judges who decline to recuse them-
selves when their campaign finances reasonably call into question their 
impartiality, the ABA has recommended mandatory disqualification of 
any judge who has accepted large contributions from a party appearing 
 
 127. Judges do have a general ethical obligation to disclose possible grounds for their disqualifi-
cation.  See FLAMM, supra note 38, § 19.10.2, at 579.  The ABA Model Code stipulates that “[a] judge 
should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might 
consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis 
for disqualification.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3E(1), Commentary (2004).  
Notice, however, that this stipulation appears only in the Commentary and is phrased in hortatory, 
not mandatory terms.  Legally, litigants “cannot require an unwilling judge to disclose facts and opin-
ions.”  Leubsdorf, supra note 42, at 242. 
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before her.  As we explained above, current recusal doctrine makes it 
extremely difficult to disqualify a judge for having received contribu-
tions from a litigant or her lawyer,128 even though we have ample evi-
dence to suggest that these contributions create not only the appearance 
of bias but also actual bias in judicial decision-making.129  This problem 
is only going to grow more acute in the coming years, as judicial election 
campaigns become increasingly expensive. 
The ABA’s solution is a per se rule for campaign contributors: dis-
qualification shall be required whenever a party, a party’s lawyer, or a 
party’s lawyer’s law firm has given the judge aggregate contributions 
above a certain amount, within a certain time period.130  By setting a 
maximum threshold, the ABA’s per se rule eliminates lawyers’ incentive 
to curry favor through large contributions.  By allowing contributions 
below that threshold, the ABA rule respects the fact that in many races 
the local bar will be in the best position to evaluate the candidates’ mer-
its—and if lawyers do not support candidates’ campaigns, special inter-
ests and self-funding will likely dominate judicial campaign finance. 
Two problems with the ABA’s formulation of the rule may help to 
explain why no states have adopted it.  First, in states with reasonable 
contribution limits, the potential for real or apparent corruption is 
largely addressed by the limits, which no individual may legally exceed.  
Under those circumstances, the ABA rule adds little or nothing to the 
campaign finance regime to protect a judge’s impartiality.  Those juris-
dictions would be better served by a rule that triggers disqualification 
after receipt of aggregate contributions of a certain amount not from a 
single donor but collectively from all donors associated with a party to 
the litigation (such as corporate officers or employees) or with counsel 
(such as law firm partners who have given in their individual capacity).  
This modification of the rule would also augment its efficacy in jurisdic-
tions that lack reasonable contribution limits.131 
Second, the mandatory disqualification required by the ABA rule 
invites gamesmanship that could defeat its purpose.  If the contribution 
threshold were set at a reasonable level, parties or lawyers could dis-
qualify an unfavorable judge by making contributions (or aggregate con-
tributions) above that amount to her campaign committee.  To prevent 
such gaming of the system, either party should be permitted to waive 
disqualification.  A waiver is preferable to requiring a motion for dis-
qualification because it keeps the onus on the court to disclose campaign 
 
 128. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 38 (citing recent empirical studies finding a significant correlation between 
campaign contributions and litigation success rates). 
 130. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 131. In the Illinois race for Supreme Court at issue in Avery, for example, State Farm made no 
contributions to Karmeier, but individuals and entities closely associated with it contributed more 
than $1 million to his campaign. 
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finance information.132 
4. Independent Adjudication of Disqualification Motions 
The fact that judges in many jurisdictions decide on their own 
recusal challenges, with little to no prospect of immediate review,133 is 
one of the most heavily criticized features of United States disqualifica-
tion law—and for good reason.  Recusal motions are not like other pro-
cedural motions.  They challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the ad-
judication.  They also challenge the judge in a very personal manner: 
they speculate on her interests and biases; they may imply unattractive 
things about her.  Allowing judges to decide on their own recusal mo-
tions is in tension not only with the guarantee of a neutral decision-
maker, but also with our explicit commitment to objectivity in this 
arena.  “Since the question whether a judge’s impartiality ‘might rea-
sonably be questioned’ is a ‘purely objective’ standard, it would seem to 
follow logically that the judge whose impartiality is being challenged 
should not have the final word on the question whether his or her 
recusal is ‘necessary’ or required.”134 
Against these arguments, several prudential objections are typically 
offered in favor of judges making their own recusal decisions.  As one 
commentator sets out the core claims: 
The primary benefit of the individual determination model is that the per-
son with the best knowledge of the facts is the person who resolves 
whether the circumstances support recusal.  Individual determination may 
also reduce the number of recusal “fishing expeditions” because parties 
will be reluctant to approach an individual [judge] with weak evidentiary 
support for a disqualification motion.  The single-judge procedure also 
enhances judicial efficiency because it avoids prolonged fact-finding hear-
ings before recusal decisions.135 
None of these critiques is wholly misguided, but we do not find 
them compelling.  The challenged judge may have the best knowledge 
of the facts, but the very biases or conflicts of interest that prompted the 
challenge in the first place may prevent her from fairly evaluating the 
import of those facts.  In addition, the judge may fear that granting a 
disqualification motion will send the signal that she is biased, even if she 
is not, and that it will raise questions about why she failed to recuse her-
self sua sponte.136  “Fishing expeditions” should be deterred by the fact 
that the third-party decision-makers will be judges themselves, and so 
 
 132. Canon 3F of the 2004 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct appears to permit waiver when 
both parties agree to it.  But requiring mutual consent perpetuates the potential for gamesmanship. 
 133. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. 
 134. Olowofoyeku, supra note 60, at 69 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Recall that 
this objective standard is the centerpiece of modern American disqualification practice and has been 
codified into law nearly everywhere.  See supra Part IV.A; supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 135. Pearson, supra note 60, at 1833 (internal citations omitted). 
 136. See supra note 119. 
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will have a professional and personal interest in ensuring that such ex-
peditions do not flourish.137  (Sanctions might also be used for frivolous 
challenges.)  And while independent adjudication of recusal motions 
does raise efficiency costs, those costs should not be substantial if deci-
sions are based on written affidavits and oral argument, rather than full-
blown adversarial hearings.  The increased procedural integrity and 
public trust fostered by an independent decision-maker may be well 
worth the price. 
5. Transparent and Reasoned Decision-Making 
Judicial disqualification in many jurisdictions is something of a 
black box: there is no systematic record of how many disqualification 
motions are decided or on what grounds.138  The failure of many judges 
to explain their recusal decisions, and the lack of a policy forcing them 
do so, offends not only a basic tenet of legal process, but also a basic 
tenet of liberal democracy—that officials must give public reasons for 
their actions in order for those actions to be legitimate.139  The lack of 
public reason-giving also creates less abstract problems: it stymies and 
distorts the development of precedent, it deprives appellate courts of 
materials for review, and it allows judges to avoid conscious grappling 
with the charges made against them.  To remedy these problems, all 
judges who rule on a disqualification motion should be required to ex-
plain their decision in writing or on the record, even if only briefly. 
6. De Novo Review on Interlocutory Appeal 
The perfunctory abuse of discretion standard of review applied to 
recusal decisions in nearly every jurisdiction has drawn its fair share of 
critics.140  Making appellate review more searching would be less impor-
tant if the other reforms on this list were adopted, but it would still pro-
vide a valuable safeguard against partiality.  It would also provide a 
measure of discipline for lower court judges, who would face a higher 
risk of disqualification—and the attendant professional embarrass-
ment—for erroneous recusal decisions.  The Seventh Circuit, the only 
 
 137. Indeed, one might argue that a challenged judge’s colleagues are not independent enough to 
rule on her disqualification motion, on account of the collegiality and reciprocity pressures that they 
will likely face in such situations.  One might therefore prefer the use of outside arbiters instead.  We 
find this idea intriguing and not necessarily outlandish, but we do not address it here because of the 
deep practical and possibly constitutional concerns that any such scheme would raise. 
 138. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Frost, supra note 48, at 560-63, 569-70, 588-90 (describing public reason-giving as a core 
tenet of Legal Process theory and recommending its incorporation into the practice of judicial dis-
qualification). 
 140. See, e.g., Paul B. Lewis, Systemic Due Process: Procedural Concepts and the Problem of 
Recusal, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 381, 407 (1990) (critiquing the abuse of discretion standard for not pro-
viding meaningful protection against judicial misconduct); Stempel, supra note 110, at 661-62 (same). 
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federal appeals court to review recusal determinations de novo, might 
shed some light on how such enhanced review operates.141 
In addition to adopting a more meaningful standard of appellate 
review, courts could improve their procedures for appeal.  While the 
standard mechanisms for filing an appeal—interlocutory orders, mo-
tions for reconsideration, and post-trial petitions—all have a role to 
play, interlocutory orders offer litigants the earliest opportunity for re-
lief.  In jurisdictions in which independent adjudication of the recusal 
motion is not implemented at the trial court level, encouraging or re-
quiring appellate courts to accept interlocutory orders in a timely man-
ner (which rarely happens at present)142 may provide a second-best al-
ternative. 
7. Mechanisms for Replacing Disqualified Appellate Judges 
The Avery case illustrates a problem with recusal procedures in 
states that do not designate a substitute for a disqualified appellate 
judge.  If Justice Karmeier had agreed to step down from the case, his 
court would have split evenly, leaving the decision below intact.  The 
potential for such even splits at the appellate level can raise serious 
problems of gamesmanship, and it undermines the precedential value of 
the resulting decisions.  It is therefore important that regardless of 
which recusal policies they adopt, courts have in place mechanisms for 
efficiently replacing a disqualified judge.143 
8. Expanded Commentary in the Canons 
Expanding the canon commentary on recusal would be a classic 
“soft” solution for regulating its practice.  This reform would be of lim-
ited value, both because of the commentary’s weak legal stature and be-
cause the discussion cannot cover all possible situations.  Nevertheless, 
it would be relatively costless to do, and it would promote adherence to 
higher ethical standards by clarifying when recusal is advisable, if not 
strictly required.  The commentary could also be expanded to provide 
more examples of situations meriting disqualification—for instance, rep-
resentative campaign statements that might reasonably be interpreted as 
indicating a commitment to a particular outcome in certain types of pro-
 
 141. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 51, at 65. 
 142. See supra note 93. 
 143. This problem has already received a great deal of attention at the federal level.  See, e.g., 
Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.); Laird v. Tatum, 
409 U.S. 824, 837-38 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.); Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the 
“Problem” of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75 (2005); Olowo-
foyeku, supra note 60, at 81-84; Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 748-50 (1973); Pearson, supra note 60, at 1806, 1836-37; see also supra note 
110 (citing to representative critiques of United States Supreme Court recusal practices). 
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ceedings—which would make it tougher for judges to deny disqualifica-
tion motions based on similar facts.144 
9. Judicial Education 
Seminars for judges that enable them to confront the standard cri-
tiques of disqualification law might provide another soft solution for in-
vigorating its practice.  Judges could be instructed on the likely under-
use and underenforcement of disqualification motions, the social 
psychological research into bias, the importance of avoiding the appear-
ance of partiality, and so forth.  These seminars might also review po-
tential reforms to recusal doctrines and court rules.  Beyond their spe-
cific teachings, simply having such seminars might help to foster a legal 
culture in which there is deeper awareness of disqualification law and its 
current flawed state. 
B. An External Solution: Recusal Advisory Bodies 
In some states in which there is heightened concern about the fall-
out from White and other pressures to abandon ethical standards, bar 
associations or other groups of volunteers have created committees to 
monitor judicial campaign conduct.145  These groups serve both as a re-
source for candidates who want to take the high road, by offering them 
cover for the refusal to lower their standards, and as a source of correc-
tive public education when advertising in judicial campaigns (by candi-
dates, political parties, or interest groups) is false or misleading.  The 
most effective committees have no official status; they work by drawing 
attention to problems and keeping participants in the electoral process 
accountable for their behavior. 
A similar model might be followed with respect to recusal.  Advi-
sory bodies could identify best practices and encourage judges to set 
high standards for themselves.  Judges could be encouraged to seek 
guidance from an advisory body when faced with difficult issues of 
recusal.  A judge accepting such advice could expect a public defense if 
a disgruntled party criticized a decision not to recuse.  In contrast, the 
 
 144. The ABA commission tasked with updating the Model Code of Judicial Conduct appears to 
have made some minor additions to the commentary on its disqualification provision, but much more 
could still be done.  See ABA REPORT, supra note 66, at Rule 2.11: Reporter’s Explanation of 
Changes (indicating that two new comments were added “to clarify that the disqualification rules 
apply regardless of whether a motion to disqualify has been filed” and “to elaborate on the meaning 
of ‘economic interest’”). 
 145. See Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respect-
ability in the Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 13 (2005) (summarizing the work of these committees in 
Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, and Ohio); The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium 
on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649, 655 (2002) (recom-
mending the creation of official and unofficial campaign conduct committees “to help assure appro-
priate campaign conduct”). 
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advisory body could disclose when a judge has ignored advice favoring 
disqualification.  The publicity would create pressure for the judges to 
follow recusal recommendations or to specify clear reasons for their de-
cision to sit on a case. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have by no means catalogued all of the possible changes to 
recusal doctrine and practice that could enhance the accountability of 
judges and protect their independence.  But even the few proposals 
briefly outlined here could compensate for some of the evident weak-
nesses in current disqualification standards and help to protect the real 
and apparent impartiality of the courts.  The challenge for elected 
judges, whose campaign supporters may well want them to rule on cases 
from which they should be disqualified, will be to overcome pressures to 
maintain the status quo.  The rising attacks on the judiciary may provide 
the needed incentives for recusal reform. 
We acknowledge that, although recusal reform is badly needed, it is 
less than a perfect solution to the problems arising in the aftermath of 
White.  Recusal is an incomplete safeguard of judicial fairness and im-
partiality because it is an individualized, case-specific remedy and so 
protects only against harms to particular litigants.  Front-end, systemic 
protections, such as canons prohibiting conduct that undermines real 
and perceived judicial impartiality, are ultimately preferable.  But the 
fact is that as those protections are being scaled back or stricken, the 
back-end disqualification of judges who either are or appear to be bi-
ased is becoming all the more important as a protection of last resort.  
Invigorating recusal would help courts currently under siege to seize the 
high ground and recover the respect of a disenchanted public. 
 
